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COMMENTS
THE IMPLIED EASEMENT AND WAY OF NECESSITY
IN WASHINGTON
HAROLD J. HUNSAKER
The implied easement arises by inference of law when certain facts
concerning the conveyance of land are found by the court. There are
two general fact patterns: (1) prior to severance of land there exists
a quasi-easement' for the benefit of one part of the land to the detri-
ment of the other; (2) after conveyance of part of a tract of land, the
grantor or grantee has no access to land respectively retained or con-
veyed. The easement arising from the former will be termed an "im-
plied easement" while the latter will be referred to as a "way of
necessity." Though both easements are implied, the two will be dis-
tinguished by the above terminology to facilitate discussion.
"I think some inaccuracy of thought and expression has arisen in
discussion by bench and bar of this doctrine of the creation of an
'A land owner cannot have an easement over his own land. The term "quasi-
easement" is used to denote the use of one part of land for the benefit of another while
both parts are held under common title. The quasi-easement is not a legal relation.
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 781 (3rd. ed. 1939).
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easement by implication ... 2" This statement seems apropos when
considering the Washington law on implied easements. That the Wash-
ington law in this area is uncertain cannot be doubted. Whether misuse
of terminology or inaccuracy of thought was the original cause of this
uncertainty is not of particular moment. It is important to recognize
that accuracy of thought is correlated with precision of expression and
that as long as terms are misapplied, subsequent thought may be cor-
respondingly defective.
The purpose of this comment is to determine the scope of the implied
easement and the way of necessity in Washington. In doing so it is
hoped that the terminology associated with such easements will be
clarified to a certain extent. Specifically, the following questions must
be answered: (1) May an easement be created by implied reservation?
(2) May the common law way of necessity be created? (3) Assuming
both exist, what effect does the Washington "private way of necessity"
statute have upon either of them?
IMPLIED EASEMENTS
An implied easement arises when there has been a unity of title, an
apparent and continuous quasi-easement existing for the benefit of one
part of the estate to the detriment of the other during such unity, and
a certain degree of necessity that the quasi-easement exist after sever-
ance as a legal easement. Unity of title is an absolute requirement. The
remaining characteristics are aids to construction. The absence of any
one of them will not necessarily destroy the possibility of an easement,
nor will the presence of all of them insure the creation of an easement.'
The doctrine of implied easements is based upon the presumed inten-
tions of the parties to the conveyance. If the facts of the individual
case are sufficient to allow a presumption to arise that both parties
intended that rights co-extensive with the quasi-easement should pass
with the dominant estate, such presumed intent will be given effect by
the court.' As stated by Walsh, the question to be asked is, "Did the
purchaser as an average reasonable man have the right to believe that
he was acquiring with the property conveyed to him an easement in
the property retained by the grantor, and did the amount paid by him
2 Pitney, V. C. in Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N.J.Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182, 184 (1892).
3 Rogers v. Cation, 9 Wn. (2d) 369, 115 P. (2d) 702 (1941) ; Cheda v. Bodkin,
173 Cal. 7, 158 Pac. 1025 (1916) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 781 (3rd. ed. 1939).
4 Wheeler v. Taylor, 114 Vt. 33, 39 A. (2d) 190 (1944) ; Dale v. Bedal, 305 Mass.
102, 25 N.E. (2d) 175 (1940) ; Scarborough v. Anderson Const. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.),
90 S.W. (2d) 305 (1936) ; Pioneer Mining Co. v. Bannack Gold Mining Co., 60 Mont.
354, 198 Pac. 748 (1921).
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for the property include payment for such an easement because of the
apparent physical situation of the two parcels with reference to one
another at the time of sale?"5 The Restatement of Property corrobo-
rates this method of approaching the problem and presents other
factors to be considered.'
Keeping in mind that the creation of an easement depends entirely
upon the presumed intent of the parties, it is apparent that if the owner
of the dominant estate can show a necessity for the continuance of the
easement, a presumption in his favor may be made more easily.
Whether such a necessity exists depends upon the facts of the par-
ticular case and one of the most important facts is whether the quasi-
dominant or the quasi-servient tenement was conveyed first. Where
the quasi-dominant tenement is first conveyed, it is said that the
grantor impliedly grants an easement across the land retained by the
grantor. Where the quasi-servient tenement is first conveyed, the
grantor impliedly reserves the right to an easement over the land of
the grantee.
For an implied grant, the grantee, as a general rule, need only show
a reasonable necessity for the easement.7 What the courts mean when
they use the term "reasonable" may be best defined by establishing its
outer extremities. It has been said that the easement will not be implied
to avoid a mere inconvenience.8 On the other hand, if the easement will
be highly convenient for reasonable use of the land, the requirement
may be satisfied.'
Although logically it would seem that the presumption in favor of
an implied reservation to the grantor should require no greater degree
of necessity than in the case of the implied grant, the law is otherwise.
This results from the application of the rules stating that a conveyance
52 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 235 (1947).
6 "(a) whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee, (b) the terms of the
conveyance, (c) the consideration given for it, (d) whether the claim is made against
a simultaneous conveyee, (e) the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,
(f) whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee, (g) the manner
in which the land was used prior to its conveyance, and (h) the extent to which the
manner of prior use was or might have been known to the parties." RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 476 (1944).7 Venegas v. Luby, 49 N.M. 381, 164 P. (2d) 584 (1946) ; Ferrel v. Durham Bank
& Trust Co., 221 N.C. 432, 20 S.E. (2d) 329 (1942) ; Freieden v. Western Bank &
Trust Co., 72 Ohio App. 471, 50 N.E. (2d) 369 (1943); Dean v. Colt, 151 Or. 331,
49 P. (2d) 362 (1935).8 Frensdorf v. Stumpf, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 211; Shandy v. Bell, 207 Ind. 215, 189 N.E.
627 (1934) ; Bean v. Dow, 84 N.H. 464, 152 Atl. 609 (1930) ; Holtz Amusement Co. v.
Schorr, 204 N.Y. Supp. 733, 122 Misc. Rep. 712 (1924); Goudie v. Fisher, 79 N.H.
424, 111 AtI. 282 (1920) ; Heyman v. Biggs, 223 N.Y. 118, 119 N.E. 243 (1918).
0 Keen v. Bump, 310 Ill. 218, 141 N.E. 698 (1923); Adams v. Gordon, 265 IIl.
87, 106 N.E. 517 (1914).
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must be construed against the person drafting the instrument" and
that a grantor cannot derogate from his own grant." The latter rule
is so strictly applied in England that one may not have an easement by
implied reservation." The American courts do not apply the rule with
such strictness, but do require a higher degree of necessity than for the
implied grant.' The usual term is "strict" necessity. The Restatement
tactfully avoids this term by stating, ". . . circumstances which may be
sufficient to imply the creation of an easement in favor of the conveyee
may not be sufficient to imply the creation of one in favor of the con-
veyor."'
4
The minorities are of two minds: one demanding strict necessity for
both the implied grant and the implied reservation," and the other
requiring reasonable necessity for either."
The terms "strict" and "reasonable" are generalizations intended to
indicate the standard by which the court will decide whether the neces-
sity requirement has been met. The cases, even within a given juris-
diction, have not given these terms a specific content so they are of
slight aid in predicting the result of a particular case.
IMPLIED EASEMENTS IN WASHINGTON
The latest case on implied easements in Washington is Wreggitt v.
Porterfield.' P and D owned adjacent property which had been owned
by a bank in 1898. A permit for a sewer was issued to the bank for the
purpose of connecting the house now on D's lot to the main sewer.
Either at this time or subsequent to conveyance by the bank (the
actual time was never decided), a sewer was constructed from P's
property to a community outhouse towards the rear of the properties
and thence through D's lot to the street which abutted both pieces of
property. D's property was the first to be conveyed by the bank. D
10 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476 (1944).
11 Wheeldon v. Burrows, L.R. 12 Ch.D. 31 (1879).
12 Ibid.
13 Wheeler v. Taylor, 114 Vt. 33, 39 A. (2d) 190 (1944); Blumberg v. Weiss,
129 N.J.Eq. 34, 17 A. (2d) 823 (1941) ; Dale v. Bedal, 305 Mass. 102, 25 N.E. (2d)
175 (1940).
14 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476 (1944).
15 Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645, 91 S.E. 536 (1917). The court states that strict
necessity is not absolute necessity. Rather, it is reasonable necessity as distinguished
from mere convenience.
16 State ex rel. McNutt v. Orcutt, 211 Ind. 523, 199 N.E. 595 (1936) ; Shandy v.
Bell, 207 Ind. 215, 189 N.E. 627 (1934); cf. Ciski v. Wentworth, 297 Pa. 317, 147
Atl. 51 (1929) ; Scarborough v. Anderson Const. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.), 90 S.W.
(2d) 305, (1936).
17 136 Wash. Dec. 593, 219 P. (2d) 589 (1950).
COMMENTS
had broken and capped P's sewer during excavation. P sued D" on the
theory of implied grant of an easement for the sewer.
The trial court found for P on the basis of implied grant. The
Supreme Court reversed this finding and stated that for an easement
by implication the following essentials must be found: "(1) Unity of
title and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant tenement;
(2) apparent and continuous user; (3) the easement must be reason-
ably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant tenement."
Should we assume that the court meant the term "easement by impli-
cation" to apply to easements by implication as a general class or only
to easements by implied grant? The court does not say. If applied to
the implied grant situation, Washington law would be in accordance
with the rule of the majority of the states. Taken literally, however,
this statement of the elements would deny the existence of the implied
reservation since the implied reservation can be created only when the
servient tenement is conveyed to the grantee. The quoted elements
refer to only the "dominant tenement." Assuming that this alone does
not prevent the creation of an implied reservation, difficulty is again
encountered when considering the requisite necessity for the implied
reservation. While the majority of states requires strict necessity for
its creation, the Washington court requires only reasonable necessity.
A brief summary of the decisions prior to the Wreggitt case will
serve to point out the manner in which the implied reservation ha
apparently been eliminated. The first thorough examination 8 of the
implied easement in Washington occurred in the case of Bailey v.
Hennessey."9 Therein it was stated that "Easements by implication
arise where property has been held in a unified title, and during such
time an open and notorious servitude has apparently been impressed
upon one part of the estate in favor of another part, and such servi-
tude, at the time that the unity of title has been dissolved by a division
of the property or a severance of the title, has been used and is reason-
ably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the portion benefitted by
such use." That this statement was meant to apply only to implied
grant situations became more apparent with the decision of Berlin v.
18 Prior cases were: Lindbloom v. Berkman, 43 Wash. 256, 86 Pac. 567 (1906);
Jemo v. Tourist Hotel Co., 55 Wash. 595, 104 Pac. 820 (1910) ; Malsch v. Waggoner,
62 Wash. 470, 114 Pac. 446 (1911); Schumacher v. Brand, 72 Wash. 543, 130 Pac.
1145 (1913) ; Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 Pac. 1146 (1913) ; Cogswell v. Cogswell,
81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 665 (1914) ; Davison v. Columbia Lodge No. 8, K. of P., 90
Wash. 461, 154 Pac. 383 (1916).
39 112 Wash. 45, 191 Pac. 863 (1920).
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Robbins,20 wherein the elements found in the Wreggitt case were first
stated. The Berlin case stated the elements as requirements for the
implied grant. At this point the law was on solid ground, but not for
long. Rather than cite the Berlin case as applying strictly to an implied
grant situation, the elements were cited in Rogers v. Cation,21 and in
subsequent cases, 2 as the basis of an easement by implication. Regard-
less of the reason for this change in terminology, the result is confusion.
Few cases have mentioned the implied reservation2 ' and no case in
Washington has been decided on the theory. Dicta indicates that the
court will require strict necessity for its creation.24 In the Wreggitt
case, the court makes an attempt to distinguish the implied grant and
reservation, but insofar as clarifying the law nothing is accomplished;
in the next paragraph the two terms are used interchangeably.25
We should assume that the court meant the broad term "easement
by implication" to refer only to the implied grant situation since all
the decided cases have been based on that theory. We have, however,
no assurance that this assumption will be vindicated in future cases.
WAY OF NECESSITY
The way of necessity is implied in accordance with the presumed
intent of the parties and the requisites of public policy. " The need for
a way of necessity usually occurs when the grantor conveys land to
which the grantee can have access only by passing over the land of the
grantor or that of a stranger, or the converse situation wherein the
grantor has no access to land retained. Ordinarily, a grantor or
20 180 Wash. 176, 38 P. (2d) 1047 (1934). The Berlin case cited no Washington
cases for authority. Cf. Davison v. Greenfield, 118 Wash. 454, 293 Pac. 948 (1922) ;
Ashton v. Buell, 149 Wash. 498, 271 Pac. 591 (1928); Hansen v. Runkel, 177 Wash.
384, 32 P. (2d) 103 (1934).
219 Wn. (2d) 369, 115 P. (2d) 702 (1941).
22 Merriweather v. Peterson, 183 Wash. 78, 48 P. (2d) 220 (1935) ; White v. Berg,
19 Wn. (2d) 284, 142 P. (2d) 260 (1943); Bushy v. Weldon, 30 Wn. (2d) 266,
191 P. (2d) 302 (1948); Evich v. Kovacevich, 33 Wn. (2d) 151, 204 P. (2d) 839
(1949).
22 Davison v. Columbia Lodge No. 8, K. of P., 90 Wash. 461, 154 Pac. 383 (1916);
Cogswell v. Cogswell, 81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 665 (1914) ; Schumacher v. Brand, 72
Wash. 543, 130 Pac. 1145 (1913).
24 Ibid.
25 "In order to give rise to the presumption of a reservation of an existing easement
or quasi-easement, where the deed is silent upon the subject, the necessity must be of
such a nature as to leave no room for doubt of the intention of the parties ... We are
satisfied that such necessity does not exist. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
third and last of the three essentials to an implied grant of an easement by implication
is missing." 136 Wash. Dec. 593, 595; 219 P. (2d) 589, 590 (1950).
26 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3rd. ed. 1939).
27 Other rights coming under the same or similar procedure are termed "easements
of necessity." This comment treats only the way of necessity. For distinction and
examples, see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 792, 793 (3rd. ed. 1939).
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grantee will not place himself in the position of owning land to which
he has no access. The presumption, therefore, is that the parties in-
tended there should be a right of access to the land conveyed or
retained. This presumption is rebutted by proof of contrary intent.
The presumption exists although a way of necessity in favor of the
grantor is contrary to the rules that the grantor cannot derogate from
his own grant and that a conveyance must be construed against the
person drafting the instrument. In this case, the presumption is based
on the public policy that all land should be put to use.
Unity of title is an absolute requirement, there being, at common
law, no right to a way of necessity over the land of a stranger." Re-
moteness as to time of unity and the existence of intervening convey-
ances are immaterial.29 Where the grantee is cut off by land other than
his grantor's, his only remedy lies in condemnation proceedings pro-
vided by statute.
A quasi-easement existing prior to severance for the benefit of the
quasi-dominant tenement to the detriment of the quasi-servient tene-
ment is not necessary.
Since there is no quasi-easement to support the inference of intent,
construction of the conveyance must be based, in large part, upon the
existing necessity for the way. While it has been said that reasonable
necessity is sufficient, the requirement is generally stated in terms of
absolute necessity. The difference, however, is not as great as the terms
indicate, since the reasonable necessity used in this context is of a
higher degree than when used in reference to implied easements."0
WAYS OF NEcESSITY IN WASHINGTON
The Constitution of the state of'Washington provides for the con-
demnation of private ways of necessity over privately held lands."1 In
28 Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 Pac. 843 (1911) ; Healy Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903); Long v. Billings, 7 Wash. 267,
34 Pac. 936 (1893).
29 3 TiFFAxY, REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3rd. ed. 1939).
so 3 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 786, 794 (3rd. ed. 1939).
81 "Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of
neecessity, and drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural,
domestic, or sanitary purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for
public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into
court for the owner, and no right-of-way shall be appropriated to the use of any
corporation other than municipal until full compensation therefore be first made in
money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of
record, in the manner prescribed by law .. " WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION,
Art. 1. § 16.
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effect, the provision is a public policy measure which prevents the
private individual from tying up a portion of the resources of the state.
The constitutional section and its later definitive statutory counterpart
are compatible with the federal Constitution guaranteeing due process
of law."
Shortly after adoption of the Washington Constitution it was held
that the constitutional provision was not self-executing and that
"... the legislature must define what are to be 'private ways of neces-
sity,' authorize persons to apply for them, and prescribe the method
by which the necessary land is to be taken."" Prior to action by the
legislature, the case of Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris4 stated that the
phrase "private way of necessity," as found in the Constitution was
to be construed with reference to that which was deemed to be a way
of necessity at common law. This meant that there would be no right
to a statutory way unless there had been unity of title and a grant
coupled with estoppel. If the law had proceeded no farther, the pro-
vision would have been either meaningless35 or a substitution of con-
demnation proceedings for the common law action, thereby abrogating
the common law way of necessity.
The Legislature, in 1913, enacted a statute 6 which set out the legal
rights available under the constitutional provision. Subsequently the
statutory way was held to be on an entirely different basis than the
common law way of necessity. A grant coupled with estoppel was no
longer a requisite. This left open the question as to whether the two
32 State ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac.
994 (1914) ; Ruddock et al. v. Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills, 28 F. (2d) 684 (9th
Cir. 1928).
33 Long v. Billings, 7 Wash. 267, 34 Pac. 936 (1893).
3433 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903). See Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash.
202, 116 Pac. 843 (1911).
35 State ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac.
994 (1914).
36 "An owner, or one entitled to the beneficial use, of land which is so situate
with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper use and enjoyment
to have and maintain any drain, flume, or ditch, on, across, over or through the land
of such other, for agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes, may condemn and take
lands of such other sufficient in area for the construction and maintenance of such
drain, flume or ditch as the case may be. The term 'private way of necessity' as used
in this act, shall mean and include a right of way on, across, over or through the
land of another for means of ingress and egress, and the construction and maintenance
thereon of roads, logging roads, flumes, canals, ditches, tunnels, tramways and other
structures upon, over and through which timber, stone, minerals and products may
be transported and carried." I .REv. STAT. § 6747 [P.P.C. § 32-1].
37 State ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac.
994 (1914); See Sultan Ry. and Timber Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 58 Wash. 604,
109 Pac. 320, 1020 (1910).
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ways co-exist. In the case of State ex rel. Carlson v. Superior Court8
the issue was "... whether one, having a legal right to pass over the
lands of his grantor, may reject the way that the law gives him and
which his grantor cannot deny him, and compel a way of necessity over
the lands of a stranger, where,. upon an admeasurement of convenience
and expense, it is held that the way over the land of a stranger is the
more practicable than the way over the land of the grantor." Though
the statutory way was denied due to lack of requisite necessity, the
dictum gives strong indication that the two ways co-exist in Wash-
ington.
If dicta may be used as a basis of prediction, absolute necessity is
required for the common law way of necessity in Washington."0 The
statutory way of necessity, however, requires only reasonable neces-
sity." Logically, therefore, this distinction, coupled with the fact that
unity of title is not a requisite for the statutory way, indicates that
many ways of necessity not available under the common-law rule may
be available under the statute.
CONCLUSION
Though the Washington court has referred to the implied reservation
of an easement, great doubt exists as to its validity in Washington.
Assuming it does exist and the court requires strict necessity for its
creation, the implied reservation will seldom be used. The private way
of necessity statute, providing for the creation of a way where there
is no unity of title and only reasonable necessity, 'has substantially
replaced it. The implied reservation will be of service where there is
unity of title, strict necessity and the cost of condemning land under
the statute is more than the land owner is willing to pay.
As in the case of the implied easement, the co-existence of the statu-
38 107 Wash. 228, 181 Pac. 689 (1919).
30 Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 Pac. 843 (1911) ; Healy Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903) ; Long v. Billings, 7 Wash. 267, 34
Pac. 936 (1893).
40 State ex rel. Erchinger v. Gilliam, 163 Wash. 111, 300 Pac. 173 (1931) ; State
ex rel. Schlief v. Superior Court, 119 Wash. 372, 205 Pac. 1046 (1922) ; State ex rel.
Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 503, 144 Pac. 722 (1914);
Samish River Boom Co. v. Union Boom Co., 32 Wash. 586, 73 Pac. 670 (1903).
"So it might be said that, notwithstanding a statute gives a land-locked owner the
right to condemn a way of necessity over the lands of a stranger, it is not a favored
statute, and the taking will not be tolerated unless the necessity is paramount in the
sense that there is no other way out or that the cost is prohibited." State ex rel.
Carlson v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 228, 232, 181 Pac. 689, 691 (1919). This neces-
sity is probably of a greater degree than that required for the common law implied
easement and of a lesser degreee than required for the common law way of necessity.
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tory way and the common law way of necessity is not particularly
advantageous. The statutory way would seem to be superior in that
less is required for its creation. The cost of condemning land, again,
will probably be the only deterrent to its use.
